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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
All of the parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The decision of the Appeals Court was issued on November 7, 2002, and is 
attached hereto in the Appendix. Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2 (3)(a) and (5) confer 
sole jurisdiction upon this Court to resolve judgments and rulings of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Initially, the Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by an Order dated February 26, 2002. R. 111. Prior to the transfer, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) conferred jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court. This Court granted 
Certiorari on March 17, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's comprehensive regulation 
of malpractice actions against health care providers governs this action by a patient 
against her therapist for allegedly mishandling the transference phenomenon, thereby 
requiring reversal of the appellate court's ruling. 
2. Whether Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997), which 
teaches that derivative claims against health care providers are subject to the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, requires reversal of the appellate court's ruling. 
3. Whether erroneous and unsupported factual assumptions on which the 
Appellate Court's decision is based require reversal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case is before the Court on Certiorari from the Opinion and Order of the 
Court of Appeals, which reversed the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment. This 
2 
Court reviews the appellate Court's decision for correctness and, in doing so, applies the 
same standard of review applicable to the original appeal. Platts v. Parents Helping 
Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). Accordingly, this Court must construe the facts 
in a light most favorable to Ms. Dowling. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, 
Inc., 2003 UT 23, ffl| 2, 13, 2003 WL 21057402, Utah Adv. Rep. (S. Ct. 
5/13/03). Determining which statute of limitation applies, and interpreting that statute, 
are questions of law reviewed for correctness. Platts, 947 P.2d at 661. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following sections of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1, et 
seq., control the outcome of this case. They are set forth in full in the Appendix: 
Section 78-14-2 
Section 78-14-3(10) 
Section 78-14-3(14) (currently numbered as 78-14-3(15)) 
Section 78-14-3(20) (currently numbered as 78-14-3(21)) 
Section 78-14-3(31) (currently numbered as 78-14-3(32)) 
Section 78-14-4(1) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings^ 
By late 1994, Ms. Dowling and her (then) husband, James Anthony Hoagland, had 
endured many years of serious on-going marital problems. Not surprisingly, their two 
daughters were also struggling emotionally. Accordingly, Ms. Dowling and James 
enrolled their daughters in therapy with Kathleen Bullen, a licensed clinical social 
worker, in December 1994. Approximately one year later, in mid-January 1996, James 
filed for divorce from Ms. Dowling; the divorce became final on September 26, 1996. 
Ms. Dowling now blames her divorce on Ms. Bullen. She alleges that Ms. Bullen 
seduced her husband and inspired him to file the divorce papers in January 1996, but that 
she did not become aware of Ms. Bullen's role until the day the divorce became final. 
She filed her lawsuit exactly four years later, on September 25, 2000. 
For purposes of summary judgment, Ms. Bullen assumed the truth of Ms. 
Dowling's allegations and proceeded on the basis that the statute of limitations expired 
long before the complaint was filed. In her moving papers Ms. Bullen set forth the facts 
essentially as pled by Ms. Dowling. R. 37 - 38, 53 - 55, 58 - 60. 
At oral argument on the motion for summary judgment Ms. Dowling argued, for 
the first time, that because Kathleen Bullen had denied a therapeutic relationship with 
1
 Trolley Corners Family Therapy Clinic and Canyon Rim Psychotherapy were never 
served with process in connection with this matter, largely because it appears that they 
are not legal entities and had no involvement in providing therapy to Ms. Dowling or 
members of her family. 
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Suzanne Dowling in her Answer to the Complaint, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
did not apply. See Transcript of Hearing, R. 115, pp. 17:1 - 20:12. The District Court 
examined the complaint and the undisputed facts set forth in Ms. Bullen's supporting 
memorandum, and concluded that Ms. Dowling had indeed alleged that she was in a 
patient/therapist relationship with Ms. Bullen, and that the alienation of affection 
occurred precisely because Ms. Bullen allegedly violated the standard of care applicable 
to that relationship. Minute Entry, R. 85-87 (also included in the Appendix). 
Consequently, the claim for alienation of affection or, more properly, mishandling of the 
transference phenomenon, was related to and arose out of the health care provided by 
Kathleen Bullen and was barred as untimely. Id. See also, Order Granting Defendant 
Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 95, ^  B (included in the Appendix). 
On appeal, Ms. Dowling pressed her argument that she was not a patient of Ms. 
Bullen, and that the alienation of affections did "not stem from any actions from Bullen 
as a therapist." Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal at 8. In doing so, she completely ignored the 
allegations of her own complaint. Accordingly, much of the discussion in Ms. Bullen's 
brief before the Court of Appeals focused upon those rather specific allegations that Ms. 
Ms. Dowling's theory of liability is generally referred to as mishandling the 
transference/countertransference phenomenon, although it is sometimes framed in terms 
of the alienation of affection. See, Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52 ^ 3, 10, 26 
P.3d 227, 229 - 231. Either way, the essence of the claim is that the patient developed 
feelings for the therapist, and the therapist inappropriately developed feelings for the 
patient, or a family member of the patient, and acted out those feelings rather than 
controlling them. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
192, 845 (1995). See also, DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 387, 1732 
(28TH ed. 1994). 
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Bullen was Ms. Dowling's therapist and that her marriage was destroyed as a result of the 
alleged malpractice committed by Ms. Bullen during the course of treatment. Ms. 
Dowling did not file a reply brief and waived oral argument to the Court of Appeals. 
Notwithstanding the allegations that Ms. Bullen breached the standard of care with 
respect to the treatment provided Ms. Dowling, the Court of Appeals reached a resolution 
that was not argued by either party: that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act governs 
injuries only to "the complaining patient," which, by implication, is the patient physically 
in the therapist's office when the malpractice occurred, even though the injuries related to 
or arose out of the entire course of treatment rendered by the therapist. Dowling v. 
Bullen, 2002 UT App 372 at H 10, 58 P.3d at 879. The Court held that Ms. Dowling's 
claims were not barred by the two-year statute of limitations in the Act, Utah Code. Ann. 
§ 78-14-4, because the specific malpractice of which she complained occurred during the 
sessions in which Ms. Bullen was seeing James, not during the sessions in which Ms. 
Bullen was seeing Ms. Dowling (or her daughters). Id. at \ 11. The Court of Appeals 
reversed the summary judgment granted by the District Court and remanded the case "for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion." Id. at f^ 11. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Suzanne Dowling was married to James Hoagland and they had two 
daughters. Complaint, R. 3,K 12. 
2. Plaintiff and her (then) husband were in individual therapy with Ms. Bullen. 
Complaint, R. 3,^13-17, 19. 
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3. Plaintiff and her (then) husband were unable to resolve their marital 
difficulties and James Hoagland filed for divorce in January 1996. Complaint, R. 3, ^ j 18. 
The divorce became final on or about September 26, 1996. Complaint, R. 3, |^ 20. 
4. On or about September 26, 1996, Ms. Dowling learned that Ms. Bullen had 
engaged in an improper relationship with her now ex-husband when her ex-husband and 
defendant Bullen announced that they were dating each other. Complaint, R. 4, ^ f 21. 
5. Plaintiff did not file her Complaint until September 25, 2000, nearly five 
years after the acts allegedly occurred. Complaint, R. 1. 
6. Ms. Dowling sued Kathleen Bullen because Ms. Bullen is a licensed 
clinical social worker who undertook to provide services to Ms. Dowling, her children 
and her husband. Complaint, R. 2 - 4, ffl[ 9 - 22. "As a result of Bullen's position as a 
counselor, Bullen occupied a special position of trust in the eyes of Plaintiff." 
Complaint, R. 3, Tf 16. 
7. Ms. Dowling alleged that Ms. Bullen breached her (Ms. Dowling's) 
therapist/patient privilege by sharing confidences gained in therapy with Ms. Bullen's 
colleagues and with James, all without Ms. Dowling's consent. Complaint, R. 5 - 6, ffl[ 
3 1 - 3 8 . 
8. Ms. Dowling next alleged that Ms. Bullen breached the terms of the 
contract to provide counseling services that would be "in the best interest of Plaintiff." 
Complaint, R. 6,1f 42. See generally, Complaint, R. 6, ffi[ 39 - 45. 
9. Paragraphs 46 through 50 of the Complaint set forth a claim for breach of 
the fiduciary relationship between Ms. Dowling and Kathleen Bullen. R. 7. She alleges 
7 
that "Defendant Bullen breached this trust by divulging Plaintiffs confidences to 
Bullen's colleagues and Defendant's husband and by using said confidences to her own 
advantage in destroying plaintiffs marriage and entering into a relationship with 
Plaintiffs husband." Complaint, R. 7, U 48. 
10. In paragraph 51 Ms. Dowling "incorporate^] paragraphs 1 through 53 [sic] 
herein by reference." Complaint, R. 7, ^ f 51. Thus, Mrs. Dowling's claim for 
mishandling the transference phenomenon is grounded in Ms. Bullen's alleged multiple 
violations of their therapy relationship. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal involves three separate grounds for relief. First, when the Health Care 
Malpractice Act is construed as a whole, the statutory wording makes clear that the 
legislature intended a comprehensive regulation of malpractice actions, including actions 
by patients against therapists for mishandling the transference phenomenon, and that the 
two-year statute of limitation bars Ms. Dowling's complaint. The creation of a "non-
complaining patient" exception is not a sound interpretation of the statute, and indeed, 
destroys its fundamental legislative purpose and eviscerates the Act. Second, the 
Appellate Court's decision directly contradicts Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1997), which held that derivative claims for malpractice, like Ms. Dowling's 
claim for mishandling the transference phenomenon during treatment by Ms. Bullen of 
her (ex-) husband, are subject to the same statute of limitations as the underlying claim. 
8 
Finally, the factual assumptions on which the opinion is based are wholly without support 
in the record. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act Governs All Claims for 
Damages Related to or Arising out of Health Care, Whether 
Direct or Derivative in Nature. 
A. The Act is a Comprehensive Regulation of Medical Malpractice Lawsuits. 
This case turns upon the interpretation of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
Utah Code. Ann. §§ 78-14-1 et seq. In its ruling, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized 
that "'[sjubsections of a statute should not be construed in a vacuum but must be read as 
part of the statute as a whole.' Dowling v. Bullen, 2002 UT App 372 at 1J9, 58 P.3d at 
878 (quoting Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985)." Unfortunately, 
the Court of Appeals failed to construe the Act as a whole, instead focusing upon only 
two provisions of one subsection of the Act, § 78-14-3(10) and -3(15). When the Act is 
construed as a whole, it becomes clear that the District Court was correct in ruling that 
Ms. Dowling's case should be dismissed for failing to comply with the applicable statute 
of limitations, and that the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
The interpretation of the Act should begin with a reading of its plain language: 
"When we interpret statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statue was meant to achieve." 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998) (citing Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993)). Before treating any 
other source, we rely first on the statute's plain language. See Schurtz v. 
BMW of N. Am. Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991)." 
Day v. Meek 1999 UT 28 at ^ 6, 976 P.2d at 1204. 
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Providing a single statute of limitations for claims against health care providers 
was a primary reason why the Health Care Malpractice Act was enacted: 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care 
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and 
to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and 
settlement of claims. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-2 (1976). 
With this purpose in mind, the legislature set about crafting a comprehensive scheme 
for regulating malpractice actions against health care providers. The Act specifically 
defines twenty-four different groups of health care providers governed by its provisions. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3. It also sets forth a broad definition of "health care 
provider" that includes additional groups of providers "rendering similar care and services 
relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and officers, 
employees, or agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their 
employment." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(12). 
When recently called upon to interpret the definition of "health care provider," this 
Court noted that the term must be broadly construed. In Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 
947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997), a claim against a treatment program for troubled youth arising 
from the suicide of a young man entrusted to its care, the Court reversed the appellate 
court's determination that only those entities identified specifically in the Act, and those 
about which there was no reasonable doubt as to the legislature's intention, were entitled to 
the protections of the Act: 
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The court of appeals justified its narrow interpretation on the ground that it is 
important for a clear distinction to be made so that a potential plaintiff may 
know whether a potential defendant is a "health care provider." [897 P.2d 
1228, 1232.] In making this distinction, the court of appeals placed 
importance on the type of license that a defendant possesses, drawing 
attention to the fact that nearly all of those listed in the Act are licensed by the 
Division of Professional Licensing under title 58. . . . [I]t concluded that 
Turnabout was excluded from the statute because it was not licensed under 
title 58, but rather was licensed by the Department of Human Services. Id. at 
1231. However, the statute makes no mention of the status or origin of the 
license under which a health care provider operates as a determining factor 
for inclusion within the statute. In fact, such a narrow interpretation would 
exclude any defendant not licensed under title 58, even if that defendant 
clearly rendered care or services similar to those rendered by the providers. 
The court of appeals ignores the plain language of the statue. 
We conclude that the statute in question means what it says. All those 
identified in the statute are "health care providers." All others rendering care 
and services similar to those so explicitly identified are also "health care 
providers." 
Platts, 947 P.2d at 662 - 663. This Court remanded the case to the District Court to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing on the extent to which the defendant treatment program engaged in 
rendering care and services similar to those carried out by the professions specifically 
identified in the Act. 
In Carter v. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital 2000 UT App 21, 996 P.2d 1076, the 
Court of Appeals applied a similarly broad reading to the provisions of the Act when it 
considered whether ambulance personnel and emergency medical technicians rendered 
similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of 
persons: 
Under the similar-services-rendered test, as explained by the Supreme Court, 
"health care provider" includes a wide range of providers, regardless of 
specific mention in the Act. In Platts II, the Court held that the definition 
even included employees of a private substance abuse program who rendered 
11 
services similar to those performed by those enumerated, presumably 
"counselors" or "social workers," both of whom are specifically listed in the 
definition. Similarly, ambulance paramedics are regularly called on to 
render, on an emergency basis, many of the same services as a hospital, 
physician, nurse, or midwife, all of whom are expressly included in the 
definition. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1999). 
Carter, 2000 UT App 21 at f 20,996 P.2d at 1080. 
Besides including a long and varied list of health care providers in the Act, the 
legislature used broad, comprehensive language to define the conduct to which the Act 
applies. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (10) defines "health care" as 
any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been 
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a 
patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement. 
(emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(15) defines a "malpractice action" as 
any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries 
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by the health care provider. 
(emphasis added.) It is difficult to envision more comprehensive language than "any act . . . 
for, to, or on behalf of a patient..." and "any action against a health care provider,... 
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider." This interpretation is bolstered by the definition of "tort" as "any 
legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing 
injury or damage to another." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(32) (emphasis added). The 
legislature did not limit the Act to the commission of torts against "complaining patients." 
In contravention of this consistent language, the Court of Appeals dramatically 
limited the reach of the Act when it held that "the alleged alienation of affections, while 
12 
arguably 'relating to or arising out of health care rendered' to James, did not relate to or 
arise out of the health care rendered to Dowling." Dowling, 2002 UT App 372 at TJ10, 58 
P.3d at 879 (citation omitted). Aside from being an incorrect interpretation of the 
uncontroverted facts alleged in the Complaint (see Point III infra), this holding severely 
undercuts the legislature's intentions and purpose in passing the Act, as recognized by this 
Court, as is not supported by its language. 
When read in the context of the facts presented by this case, the appellate court's 
ruling requires that the malpractice in question must occur while the patient is in the therapy 
session, the doctor's office, the surgical suite, or otherwise in direct and actual treatment 
with the provider. Neither the provider who harms a patient during the course of other care-
related activities (such as during counseling with the patient's family, handling the patient's 
records, intervening with government agencies on behalf of the patient, dealing with the 
pharmacy, or consulting with other care givers about the patient), nor the patient who is 
harmed by any such activities, is protected by the Act. The Court of Appeals has artificially 
narrowed the broad phrase "any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, 
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death or otherwise" and "relating to or arising out of 
health care rendered or which should have been rendered" found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-3(15) by applying the most restrictive reading possible of the phrase "during the patient's 
medical care, treatment or confinement" contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(10). The 
Court of Appeals offers no support for its narrow reading of these provisions. 
Other provisions of the Act support the conclusion that the lower court's reading is 
erroneous. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(21) defines "patient" as "a person who is under the 
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care of a health care provider, under a contract, express or implied." The phrase "under the 
care of a health care provider" strongly suggests that the legislature was looking to the 
overall relationship of care giver and patient, not just to conduct in the examining room or 
during an office visit, as the appellate court has done. 
A person is "under the care" of a doctor even when she is not in the doctor's office 
so long as she is consulting the doctor from time to time with respect to a particular medical 
problem. This is even truer in the context of mental health care, where treatment can often 
take months or years and involve a wide variety of circumstances and relationships. When 
the Court of Appeals chose to restrict application of the phrase "during the patient's medical 
care, treatment, or confinement," to those circumstances in which the health care giver was 
dealing directly with the "complaining patient," it robbed the legislature's definition of 
"patient" of its natural meaning. The phrase "under the care of a health care provider" and 
the phrase "during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement," can only be 
reasonably interpreted to refer to the overall relationship between the patient and the care 
giver. If the therapist errs in the provision of care to, for, or on behalf the patient while there 
is an on-going therapist/patient relationship, even if the error does not occur during an actual 
therapy session, the rights of both the patient and the therapist should still be governed by 
the Health Care Malpractice Act. 
The language of the statute of limitations in the Health Care Malpractice Act is also 
at odds with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) says "[n]o 
malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
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diligence should have discovered the injury,...." (emphasis added.) This language means 
that the plaintiff has two years to bring an action, whether the plaintiff is the "complaining 
patient" or not. 
Notably, the provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act that deal with the pre-
litigation screening panel hearing process do not distinguish between malpractice claims 
brought by "complaining patients" and those brought by others. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 
simply states that "[n]o malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated 
unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at 
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action." (emphasis added.) This 
provision goes on to state that "[s]uch notice shall be served within the time allowed for 
commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider."3 
The near-exhaustive list of providers explicitly included within the definitions of 
the Act, the broad language extending coverage of the Act to those who provide similar 
services, the extensive use of the article "any" when describing "malpractice actions," 
"health care," and "tort," the broad definition of "patient," including rendering services 
to, for, or on behalf of the patient, and the legislature's recognition that a "plaintiff may 
not necessarily be a "complaining patient," lead inescapably to the conclusion that the 
Utah Legislature intended the Act to be a comprehensive regulation of malpractice 
3
 Ms. Bullen raised Plaintiffs failure to comply with the pre-litigation screening panel 
hearing procedure as a ground for dismissal in her motion for summary judgment. R. 36 
- 43. However, the District Court did not base her ruling on this argument or upon these 
provisions of the Act. See Minute Entry, R. 85 - 87. Accordingly, the Order and 
Judgment did not address this issue. R. 88 - 92. 
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actions against those who err in the provision of health care services. This comports with 
the stated purpose of the legislation as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. 
B. The Court of Appeals' New Category of "Complaining Patient" Undermines the 
Coverage of the Act 
The appellate court has read out of the statute the broad language discussed above, 
and substituted in its place very restrictive language limiting application of the Act to the 
"complaining patient." As a result of the appellate court's opinion, "health care" is now 
essentially defined as 
any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been 
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a 
complaining patient during the complaining patient's medical care, 
treatment, or confinement. 
Likewise, "malpractice action" now means 
any action by a complaining patient against a health care provider, whether 
in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based 
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider to 
that complaining patient. 
Similarly, the definition of "patient" has been altered to read something like "a person who 
is under the actual and direct care of a health care provider at the moment the malpractice 
is committed" and "tort" has been re-defined to mean "any legal wrong, breach of duty, or 
negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to the 
complaining patient" (See, e.g., Bowling, 2002 UT App 372 at f 9.) 
In making its ruling, the Court of Appeals apparently presumed that mental health 
care occurs only in a very narrow set of circumstances, such as on the examining room 
table, or during surgery. However, mental health treatment often involves the whole family, 
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and frequently requires interventions by the therapist on behalf of the patient in settings 
other than a formal therapy session. Further, most visits are an hour in length, rather than 
the more traditional ten or fifteen minute doctor visit, and tend to deal with a broad range of 
thinking and emotional disorders that impact a wide spectrum of the patient's life. The 
therapy interventions are rarely the precise and objective treatments that internists, 
cardiologists or oncologists can employ. Consequently, many of the activities of the mental 
health community aire effectively excluded from the coverage of the Act by the appellate 
court's interpretation. 
This Court recognized the distinction between conventional medicine and mental 
health treatment in Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993), a case dealing 
with an attack on a young girl by a paranoid schizophrenic patient. There the plaintiffs 
argued for "a general duty to any third party foreseeably at risk from their negligence in 
treating and supervising" the patient. Id. at 235. The plaintiff analogized the therapist's 
duty to the obligation of the doctor to treat infectious or contagious diseases but, the Court 
rejected the argument: 
This attempted analogy fails for the following reasons: First, infectious 
diseases are generally more identifiable than dangerous mental illness; 
second, there is more certainty of harm with an infectious disease than from a 
patient who may be labeled "dangerous"; and third, the means of preventing 
harm from an infectious disease are usually less restrictive of personal 
freedom than the means used to prevent harm from those with mental illness. 
Id. at 236, n.4. See also, Kansas Supreme Court opinion responding to questions certified 
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals attached as an Appendix to Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 
F.2d 888, 889, 14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1874 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating "[o]bviously, such 
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diverse medical specialties as dermatology, radiology, pediatrics, surgery, and psychiatry 
confront the professional practitioner of each with radically different medical problems."). 
In this regard, the legislature's decision to extend the protections of the Act to "any 
act or treatment performed or furnished . . . by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf 
of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement," Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-3 (10) (emphasis added), makes good sense. 
Moreover, there are serious practical problems with the appellate court's ruling. It 
does not explicitly define the term "complaining patient," nor does it set forth an analytical 
framework for determining when a plaintiff is the "complaining patient" or when she has 
some other status. Selecting and analyzing the appropriate statute of limitations, an often 
difficult process at best, has been rendered far more problematic by the appellate court's 
addition of a complex new layer of analysis. 
The underlying facts of this case illustrate just how difficult the process is. 
According to the complaint, Ms. Bullen was trying to help Ms. Dowling and her (then) 
husband resolve deep, long-standing marital problems, and was trying to help their 
daughters cope with a deteriorating home environment. She was, as Ms. Dowling alleges, 
the family therapist. The treatment provided by Ms. Bullen during that therapeutic process 
is health care rendered to, for, or on behalf of Ms. Dowling. (Even though Ms. Dowling 
called this argument "absurd," Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 14, in her 
Statement of the Case, Ms. Dowling herself asserted that, "[i]n [Ms. Bullen's] counseling 
of James, which, incidentally, was to assist in the reparation of the family not its 
destruction, she started an intimate relationship that led to the destruction of Dowling's 
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marriage." Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 6. (Emphasis added.)) It 
seems clear enough that the parties considered Ms. Dowling to be "under the care of a 
health care provider," Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(21). Ms. Bullen's therapy ought to be 
controlled and governed by the Health Care Malpractice Act, including the statute of 
limitations. If Ms. Dowling is not a "patient," then what is she? Under what circumstances 
does one cease being a "patient" and slip into some other role? 
In spite of the uncontroverted fact that Ms. Dowling was under Ms. Bullen's care at 
the time of the events alleged in the complaint, the Court of Appeals concluded that she was 
not a patient, or at least not the "complaining patient," and refused to apply the provisions of 
the Act. It concluded, in essence, that if the malpractice occurred while Ms. Bullen was 
treating other family members, even though that treatment was ostensibly in furtherance of 
the underlying treatment objectives for Ms. Dowling and other members of her family, that 
treatment does not come within the reach of the Act. The obvious—and only—way to 
interpret this ruling is that the Act applies only when the patient is in the therapy session, in 
the examining room, in the surgical suite, or in some other way in direct and actual 
treatment by the health care provider when the malpractice occurs. This contradicts the 
broad, comprehensive language employed by the legislature. 
Not only is the ruling inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, when 
applying the statute of limitations it shifts the traditional analytical focus from the 
conduct and status of the defendant to the status of the plaintiff, thus giving rise to 
multiple statutes of limitation arising from the very same conduct. 
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Statutes of limitation are, in the tort context at least, based upon the linkage 
between the nature of the conduct at issue and the status of the defendant. For example, 
there is one statute of limitation for claims against public officials for "malfeasance, 
misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office," UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-24; one for fraudulent 
conveyances, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(2); one for damage to or trespass upon real 
and personal property, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26; one for wrongful death and for 
personal injury caused by law enforcement officers and public officials, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-12-28; one for defamation, assault, battery, seduction and false imprisonment, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4); one for manufacturing and selling defective products, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3; one for medical malpractice, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4; 
and one for "relief not otherwise provided by law," UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3). In 
each case, the limitation is based upon the status of the alleged tortfeasor and what the 
alleged tortfeasor did, not upon who the injured party was. 
The reason for this is, of course, that lawsuits are based upon alleged wrongs 
committed by one person or class of people against another. The fundamental 
justification for a judicial system is that people will inevitably engage in conduct that 
harms or offends, for which redress must be made in order to prevent resort to self-help 
and anarchy. The law controls behavior, not status or belief; it is a conduct-based system. 
It is much easier and more practical to proscribe certain behavior or impose certain duties 
by limiting the conduct of the potential defendant because that can be done by class or 
category. Basing the statute of limitations upon the status of the plaintiff results in the 
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imposition of multiple limitations periods for the very same conduct, thereby making 
operation of the statute non-uniform and largely unpredictable. 
For example, suppose that a therapist is treating a woman he negligently believes 
has been abused, and that he counsels that spouse to initiate divorce proceedings and 
obtain a protective order. The allegedly abused spouse clearly has two years from the 
date she knew or should have known of the allegedly negligent advice to file suit. The 
husband, though, would have four years to sue under various theories, such as negligence 
or alienation of affections, because he is not "the complaining patient." 
There are other troubling examples. Assume a woman seeks advice and treatment 
for infertility and is negligently prescribed drugs that destroy her reproductive organs. 
She has two years to file suit. Her husband, though, has several statutes from which to 
choose, including the one-year assault/battery statute, the four-year "catch-all" statute, a 
two-year defective product statute or, if she dies, a two-year wrongful death statute, all 
triggered by different conduct, some subject to a "discovery rule"4 and some not. 
The flip side of the birth control scenario also gives rise to conflicting statutes of 
limitation. Suppose a husband seeks out a vasectomy because the health of his wife will 
not permit a pregnancy. If the wife becomes pregnant because of a negligently 
4
 The issue of whether Ms. Dowling's claim here is subject to a "discovery rule" was 
raised at the oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. Transcript of Hearing, 
R. 115, pp. 20:13 - 21:4. Ms. Dowling wants the length of the four-year "catch-all" 
statute of limitation found at Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) combined with the 
"discovery rule" of the Act in question, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1). However, 
inasmuch as the District Court ruled that Ms. Dowling's action was governed—and 
barred—by the Act, it did not address the "discovery rule." 
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performed operation and suffers severe and permanent injury from complications due to 
pregnancy and/or childbirth, the husband has two years from the date he knew or should 
have known of the negligent operation in which to file suit because he is "the 
complaining patient." The injured spouse, however, has up to four years to file suit. 
Further, if the appellate court's ruling that the Act does not apply to the complaining 
patient's spouse is correct, the injured wife could have four years from the date her cause 
of action arose, regardless of whether it was a few months after the operation or several 
years later, where the husband's claim would be constrained by the four-year statute of 
repose found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(l).5 See C.S v. Nielsen, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 
1988) ("Wrongful pregnancy" is a valid cause of action but costs of rearing healthy child 
are not recoverable as damages.) 
The negligent OB-GYN scenario is even more problematic. Who is the 
"complaining patient" in a case where the doctor negligently monitors the fetus and 
causes irreparable brain injury to the child? The fetus? The mother? The father? 
Several potential statutes of limitation emerge if the analysis is based upon who the 
plaintiff is and can differ depending upon whether the mother has a guardian. See the 
discussion of Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah 
1997) infra. See also Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, 464 
5
 The 4-year statute of repose was also raised as an argument by Ms. Bullen in her motion 
for summary judgment. R. 3 6 - 4 3 . The District Court did not address this argument in 
granting the motion. See Minute Entry, R. 85 - 87. Accordingly, it was not included in 
the Order and Judgment. R. 88 - 92. 
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Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (discussing the Wrongful Life Act and highlighting several causes of 
action arising from negligent OB-GYN care). 
The class of derivative claims commonly known as negligent release/failure to 
warn cases also presents an interesting dilemma under the appellate court's ruling. The 
doctrine regarding negligent release and/or duty to warn third parties of a patient's 
violent threats, developed in Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993 and 
later codified by the legislature at Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102, does not contain a 
specific statute of limitations, and the applicable period is an unresolved question. See 
Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998). Inasmuch as the therapist's 
duty regarding release of the patient and the need to warn is ultimately grounded in the 
therapist/patient relationship, is a claim against the therapist for breach of this duty a 
form of malpractice that must be brought pursuant to the Health Care Malpractice Act? 
If the patient herself is injured because of a negligent early release, say by an attempted 
suicide, must the action be brought within the two years provided by the Act? If a victim 
is injured by a violent assault perpetrated by the negligently released patient, is the statute 
of limitations only one year provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(3), or two? 
As a final example, take a case where a person's seizure medication is 
mismanaged by the doctor, thereby causing a serious automobile accident. The seizure 
patient has two years to file suit for his injuries. The family of the seizure patient has at 
least four years to file suit for the very same act of negligence. 
In each of these examples, the "complaining patient" is limited to seeking 
recovery during the statutory period set forth in the Health Care Malpractice Act. 
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However, family members of the complaining patient, and other victims of the 
malpractice, are not. They have either shorter or longer limitations periods depending 
upon the nature of the harm and the theory of liability. The difference in the statutes of 
limitation has nothing to do with whether the injuries are more serious in one case than 
the other, or with whether the injuries are more difficult to detect or are latent in nature. 
Nor are they related to the underlying social policy of making medical care more 
available. There is no logical basis for these distinctions. It is a purely arbitrary 
distinction based solely on the plaintiffs status as a complaining patient.6 
In enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, the Legislature declared that "it 
is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for 
which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-2. This purpose is fundamentally frustrated by 
the appellate court's selection of a statute of limitations based upon the status of the 
Plaintiff as a "complaining patient" rather than choosing the statute based upon the nature 
6
 On the closely related question of the duties that may be owed by the health care 
provider, the recent case of Alder v. Bayer Corporation, 2002 UT 115, ^ 26 - 28, 61 
P.3d 1068, 1077, holds that one who fulfills contractual duties in a negligent manner is 
potentially liable to third parties whom the contracting party could reasonably expect to 
be injured by such negligent conduct, pursuant to Restatement (2d) Torts, § 324A. It is 
axiomatic that the doctor, therapist, or other health care provider, would expect innocent 
third parties to be harmed by the negligent performance of medical or mental health care 
to her patients, including family members, and maybe even co-workers or neighbors, of 
those patients. Accordingly, the statute of limitations dilemma posed by these 
hypothetical examples is both immediate and real. 
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of the allegedly tortious behavior and whether the injury related to or arose out of health 
care provided to, for or on behalf of a patient.7 
This Court recently addressed the "relating to or arising out o f language found in 
the Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-3(14). In Smith v. Four 
Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, 2003 WL 21057402, Utah Adv. 
Rep. , the Court considered whether Four Corners Mental Health Center was 
performing health care services or foster care services when it placed both the plaintiff 
and a violent child with the same foster family. The Court began by examining the 
purpose of the Health Care Malpractice Act as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. It 
then noted that the plaintiff did not challenge the Center's status as a health care provider 
generally. "Therefore, the only question we are concerned with is whether Smith's injury 
was related to or arose out of the provision of mental health care." Four Corners Mental 
Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23 at If 31, Utah Adv. Rep. at . 
In examining whether the claim related to or arose out of the rendering of health 
care, this Court looked first to the allegations of the complaint: 
Smith's complaint claims that Four Corners "knew, had reason to know, or 
should have known that [J.B.] possessed a violent character, and 
demonstrated homosexual tendencies." He alleges that Four Corners 
The creation of a category for "complaining patient" may render the statute 
unconstitutional under the uniform operation of the laws provision of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, § 24. See, e.g., Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) (The 
Act's statute of limitations as to the claims of minors, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2), is 
unconstitutional under Art. I, § 24, because it treats minors and adults as though they 
were similarly situated and because it discriminates against minors injured by health care 
providers). The constitutionality of this interpretation was not raised below because it is 
an artifact of the appellate court's decision, not an underlying issue presented to the 
District Court. 
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should be held liable for several reasons, including the following: failing 
to provide adequate caseworker services to himself and J.B., failing to 
supervise the preparation and implementation of Smith's treatment plan, 
and failing to inform the Randalls and Smith of J.B.'s dangerous 
characteristics. These allegations all arise out of Four Corners' provision 
of mental health services. 
Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23 at ^ 35, Utah Adv. Rep. at 
. The Court next examined answers to interrogatories, something not available in 
this case because of the procedural posture of the case at the time the motion for 
summary judgment was filed. Based upon that material the Court concluded that "the 
reason Four Corners became involved in providing Smith foster care services arose out of 
its provision of mental health care to Smith. Because Smith's own allegations arise out 
of the fact that Four Corners provided mental health services directly to him, Smith was 
required to follow the procedural requirements of the UHCMA." Id. at % 36. Thus, even 
though the immediate context out of which Smith's claim arose was the provision of 
foster care, the fact that the foster care arose out of the provision of mental health 
services was sufficient to subject Smith to the rigors of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
The allegations by Ms. Dowling in this case are similar in nature to the allegations 
of Smith in Four Corners. Ms. Dowling expressly alleges that in alienating James's 
affections, 1) Ms. Bullen breached her position of trust with Ms. Dowling, 2) that she 
breached Ms. Dowling's patient/therapist privilege, 3) that she breached her contractual 
obligations to Ms. Dowling, 4) that she breached her obligation to act in the best interests of 
Ms. Dowling, and 5) that she breached her fiduciary duty to Ms. Dowling. As plaintiff 
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alleged, in ^  53 of the Complaint, R. 7, "Defendant Bullen, by her actions in divulging 
Plaintiffs confidences, used her position of trust and influence as a licensed clinical social 
worker and family counselor, to poison Plaintiffs husband against Plaintiff." 
There are other striking parallels between Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health 
Center and this case. Both involve the provision of mental health services. In both cases 
the entire families were involved in the treatment process. Both involve a case where the 
alleged wrong occurred during the rendering of care to someone other than the plaintiff, 
i.e., J.B. in Four Corners and James Hoagland in the instant case. Both involve the 
situation where the plaintiff is claiming to be someone other than what the appellate court 
called "the complaining patient." In both cases the plaintiffs also alleged that the 
therapist(s) breached the standard of care in rendering mental health care directly to them 
as well as to the others. Both cases illustrate the wisdom of construing the statute so that 
it applies uniformly across the entire treatment context. 
In Four Corners, the Court focused on the status of the defendant, i.e., whether it 
was a health care provider, and the nature of the alleged wrong. It did not inquire 
whether Mr. Smith was the "complaining patient." It looked to see whether the alleged 
wrong-doing was reasonably connected to the rendering of health care to, for, or on 
behalf of the patient, rather than to whether the alleged wrong-doing occurred during an 
actual therapy session. If the Four Corners Court had followed the analysis laid out by 
the appellate court in the instant case it would have reached a contrary result with respect 
to the applicability of the Health Care Malpractice Act because the mistake at issue was 
the placement of J.B. in the Randalls' home. 
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Analogously, the courts have broadly construed "relating to or arising out o f 
language from the Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Annotated, § 32A-2-401. 
For example, in Buczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah the Court said that 
[a]n accident arises out of employment when there is a causal relationship 
between the injury and the employment. Arising out of, however, does not 
mean that the accident must be caused by the employment; rather, the 
employment is thought of more as a condition out of which the event arises 
than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion. 
934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Obviously, the therapy provided by Ms. 
Bullen was the condition out of which the alleged alienation of affection arose. 
Moreover, there is a direct causal relationship between the therapy and the alleged tort 
because it was only through the therapy that Ms. Bullen became acquainted with Ms. 
Dowling and James, and it was only through the therapy that Ms. Bullen "developed 
feelings" for James. Here it can plainly be said that the mishandling of the transference 
phenomenon arose directly out of the therapy. 
In Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2000 UT App 35, 996 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2000), the Court held that an employee injured while salting his driveway at 
home came within the purview of the Worker's Compensation Act because he was 
preparing the driveway for a work-related delivery. The "injury arose in the course of his 
employment because his efforts to make his driveway safe for the delivery of work-
related materials was 'reasonably incidental' to his work for Ae Clevite." 2000 UT App 
35, TI 10; 996 P.2d at 1075. Under this construction of the phrase "arising out o f there 
can be little doubt that the alleged mishandling of the transference phenomenon 
complained of by Ms. Dowling is directly related to and arises out of the therapy 
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provided by Kathleen Bullen. All of Ms. Bullen's dealings with the plaintiff and her 
family were in the context of therapy, whether Ms. Dowling is considered Kathleen's 
patient or not. Her work with the family, including her meetings with Ms. Dowling and 
James, were for the purpose of furthering the therapeutic progress of family members. 
Significantly, the alleged alienation of affection did not occur just while Ms. Bullen was 
preparing for therapy but, according to Ms. Dowling's Complaint, while therapy was 
going on. See also, Natl Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 
511 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978) (stating, "[a]s used in a liability insurance policy, the 
words 'arising out of are very broad, general and comprehensive. They are commonly 
understood to mean originating from, growing out of, or flowing from, and require only 
that there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk for which coverage 
is provided."). 
While neither the Worker's Compensation Act nor a liability insurance contract 
are perfect analogies to the Health Care Malpractice Act, both illustrate the inclination of 
the courts to construe the "relating to or arising out o f language broadly. A broad 
construction of this language allows for the uniform application of the statute of 
limitations to all health care providers and thus fulfills the stated purpose of the Act of 
making health care more affordable and available to the public. UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 78-14-2. 
C. The Court of Appeals has Removed Breach of Confidentiality from the Act 
It is well-established that the patient has a privilege of confidentiality regarding 
information shared in the context of therapy. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-60-102(2), 58-60-
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110, and 58-60-114; Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, 999 P.2d 582; Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 506. See also, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(14) (1994). Breach of the 
duty of confidentiality has traditionally given rise to a claim for malpractice against the 
therapist that is governed by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
In this case Ms. Dowling alleged that "Defendant Bullen, by her actions in 
divulging Plaintiffs confidences, used her position of trust and influence as a licensed 
clinical social worker and family counselor, to poison Plaintiffs husband against 
Plaintiff." Complaint, R. 7, T|53. (emphasis added.) In its opinion, the Court of Appeals 
held that 
. . . the alleged alienation of affections, while arguably "relating to or 
arising out of health care rendered" to James, id., did not relate to or arise 
out of the health care rendered to Dowling. Dowling, the patient, has not 
complained of "any act or treatment performed or furnished . . . by [Bullen] 
for, to, or on behalf of [Dowling] during [Dowling]'s medical care, 
treatment, or confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(10). Thus we 
conclude that the Act, when read as a whole, does not apply to Dowling's 
alienation of affections claim since Dowling is not "the patient []," id., out 
of whose health care the alleged wrong arose. 
Dowling, 2002 UT App 372, \ 10, 58 P.3d at 879. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals has 
removed breach of confidentiality from the coverage of the Act. 
By definition, a breach of confidence occurs when the therapist reveals 
information to someone other than the person to whom that information belongs without 
that person's consent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-60-102(2); Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
506(b). How can that occur while the patient is sitting in the therapy session with the 
therapist? The breach of a patient's confidentiality usually occurs when an attorney 
subpoenas records, when the care giver testifies on deposition, when the patient's family 
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member discusses the patient's situation with the care giver, in an unguarded moment 
during a casual conversation between the care giver and colleagues or friends, in a research 
context, or some similar setting. If the plaintiff must literally be in the treatment session, 
i.e., receiving "medical care, treatment, or confinement" when the breach of 
confidentiality occurs in order to qualify as the "complaining patient" as the Court of 
Appeals held, she will almost never qualify and, hence, her claims against the therapist 
will rarely (if ever) be governed by the Health Care Malpractice Act. 
The ruling of the appellate court creates an intolerable situation. Confidentiality is 
the mark of the doctor/patient relationship. It is a fundamental duty. Not only that, it is a 
continuing duty. Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, 999 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 2000) 
(reversing summary judgment in favor of psychiatrist where question of fact existed as to 
whether former patient had waived privilege of confidentiality in divorce proceeding); 
Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and Prof I Licensing, 810 P.2d 
459, 467 n.14 (Utah App. 1991) (stating, "[likewise, the professional obligation of 
attorneys and psychologists to protect the confidential communications of their clients 
extends well beyond the termination of the professional's engagement."). By effectively 
ruling that breach of confidentiality is not subject to the Health Care Malpractice Act, the 
appellate court has chosen to treat confidentiality as just another common law duty 
subject to factors beyond and different from the confines of the traditional doctor/patient 
relationship. The duty may be expanded or contracted without giving due consideration 
to the critical nature of the therapist/patient relationship. More practically, if the Court of 
Appeals' ruling is left standing, one patient will have two years to sue the therapist for 
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those rare breaches that occur while the patient is actually in a therapy session and the 
bulk of the patients will have four years to sue for the more common breach that occurs at 
any time other than during a formal therapy session, whether there is an on-going 
therapist/patient relationship or not. 
II. The Appellate Court's Decision Directly Conflicts with Jensen v. 
IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). 
The Court of Appeals held that "[t]he Act's statute of limitations does not 
automatically apply to any cause of action simply because a health care provider provided 
health care." Bowling, 2002 UT App 372 at T| 9, 58 P.3d at 878. Instead, it opines that Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-3(10, read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(15) "requires 
that the health care in question must have been provided to the complaining patient." Id. 
This conclusion conflicts with this Court's holding in Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). 
In Jensen, this Court wrestled with whether the wrongful death or the medical 
malpractice statute of limitation should govern a claim for the death of Shelly Hipwell, a 
young mother fatally injured while being treated for complications arising from a 
caesarian delivery. Following the delivery, the young mother was transferred from the 
McKay-Dee Hospital to the University of Utah Medical Center for further treatment. 
While undergoing further treatment there, she suffered an anoxic brain injury, leaving her 
comatose and totally and permanently disabled for the next three and a half years, until 
her death. The family filed suit against McKay-Dee Hospital about three years after the 
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caesarian section and against the University Medical Center about 3 months after the 
mother's death. The trial court rejected both claims as untimely. 
On appeal the family argued that a claim for wrongful death cannot arise until 
after the patient has died and that the law suit was brought well within the two-year 
statute of limitations for wrongful death. This Court held that the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations governed this case, not the wrongful death statute, and that it began 
to run when the family learned that the young mother's comatose and disabled condition 
was due to that malpractice: 
When we are faced with two statutes that purport to cover the same 
subject, we seek to determine the legislature's intent as to which applies. In 
doing this, we follow the general rules of statutory construction, which 
provide both that "the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain 
language of the statute," Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 
(Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 
903, 906 (Utah 1984)), and that "'a more specific statute governs instead of 
a more general statute.'" De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 
743, 748 (Utah 1996) (quoting Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 
(Utah 1991) (citations omitted)). In this case, the Medical Malpractice 
Act's plain language indicates a legislative intent to have the statute apply 
to claims such as the ones Shelly's family seeks to bring. 
Jensen, 944 P.2d at 331. 
Justice Zimmerman, writing for a unanimous court, concluded that the wrongful 
death claim was barred by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, even though it was 
brought within a few months of the death. Id. The Court held that the negligence giving 
rise to the young mother's persistent vegetative state, and not the subsequent death, 
triggered the running of the two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 332. The mother's cause 
of action expired a year (or more) before her death, and the family, whose claims were 
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derivative of the treatment given to the mother, was barred by the statute of limitations from 
pursuing a wrongful death claim based upon that treatment. Id. The Court further held that 
even though a wrongful death claim seeks damages for the death of a loved one, and is in 
that sense separate from the personal injury claim of the injured party who subsequently 
died, the fact that the wrongful death claim is derivative of the underlying personal injuries 
suffered by the decedent subjects it to the same two-year statute of limitation. Id. 
Accordingly, the family's claim for the wrongful death expired more than a year before Ms. 
Hipwell actually died. 
The family then argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled because the 
doctors and the hospitals committed fraud by concealing the malpractice leading to the 
young mother's death. The family invoked the general three-year statute of limitations 
applicable to fraud actions, § 78-12-26(3), but the Court held that the two-year provision 
in the Health Care Malpractice Act dealing with fraudulent concealment, § 78-14-4(1) 
(b), governed: 
The medical malpractice statute of limitations, with its discovery rule and 
that rule's fraudulent concealment doctrine, applies to every "malpractice 
action against a health care provider" As noted above, the statute defines 
"malpractice action against a health care provider" to include actions for 
wrongful death "based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising 
out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(14). Thus, the medical 
malpractice act's two-year statute of limitations applies to cases of 
fraudulent concealment arising out of medical malpractice. 
Id. at 336. (emphasis added.) 
Ms. Dowling's claim for the alienation of affections, like the claim for wrongful 
death asserted by the family of Shelly Hipwell, is based upon, i.e., derivative of, the 
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treatment rendered by Ms. Bullen to James Hoagland. Like the Jensen/Hipwell Family's 
claim for wrongful death, it ought to be governed by the same statute of limitations that 
applies to the underlying claim. In applying the generalized "catch-all" statute of 
limitations to the alienation of affections claim, the Court of Appeals has directly 
contradicted Supreme Court precedent. 
The ruling of the Court of Appeals would allow the Jensen family members to sue 
for Shelly Hipwell's wrongful death because they were not "the complaining patient." 
Dowling, 2002 UT App 372 at Tf 9, 58 P.3d at 878. The holding of the appellate court is that 
even though Ms. Dowling's cause of action derives from the treatment rendered to James, 
she still has a separate claim for her own damages and, hence, a different (and much longer) 
statute of limitations. However, the gravamen of each claim is the destruction of a 
cherished relationship. In each case, a family member alleged damage because of 
malpractice to another family member. The claims are derivative in exactly the same 
way. Just as the Jensen/Hipwell family's wrongful death claim was barred by the 
expiration of the statue on Shelly Hipwell's malpractice claim, Ms. Dowling's alienation 
of affections claim is barred by the passage of time on James Hoagland's claim. 
In reality, the instant case presents double grounds for application of the two-year 
statute when compared to Jensen. None of the family members in Jensen was a patient of 
the defendants, that is, the family's claim for the wrongful death of their loved one was 
entirely derivative of the health care rendered to that loved one. By contrast, Ms. Dowling's 
claim for mishandling the transference phenomenon is expressly based upon the alleged 
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violation of duties owed directly to her. However, it is also derivative of the health care 
rendered to her (ex) husband. 
There is no question that Ms. Dowling's direct claims of malpractice against Ms. 
Bullen are subject to the two-year statute. Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52,26 P.3d 
27 (holding Patient's claim against her therapist for mishandling the transference 
phenomenon and destruction of her marriage was barred by two-year medical malpractice 
statute of limitation even though her action was filed nine months after their sexual 
relationship ended). In addition, Jensen subjects Ms. Dowling's derivative claims to that 
same two-year statute. In this respect, the ruling of the Court of Appeals directly 
contradicts the ruling of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the 
ruling issued by the Court of Appeals and reinstate the District Court's summary judgment. 
III. The Appellate Court's Factual Assumptions Are Not Supported 
By The Record. 
The factual predicate of the appellate court's opinion is that Ms. Dowling did not 
complain of the acts or treatment furnished for, to, or on behalf of herself, but only of the 
acts or treatment furnished to James, her husband. Dowling, 2002 UT App. 372 at ^ f 10, 58 
P.3d at 879. From this factual predicate the appellate court concluded that James would 
have to sue within two years, but that Ms. Dowling's allegation of malpractice against Ms. 
Bullen was not constrained by the Health Care Malpractice Act and could be brought under 
the 4-year catch-all statute of limitations otherwise applicable for claims of alienation of 
affection. Id. 
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The complaint, however, is absolutely clear that these alleged violations occurred 
during the time that Ms. Dowling was in treatment with Ms. Bullen. She alleges that Ms. 
Bullen "initiated an intimate relationship with James, prior to the filing of the petition for 
divorce," Complaint, R. 4, If 22, and that the petition for divorce was filed "[d]uring 
January 1996." Complaint, R. 3, ^  18. She then alleged that, "[i]n February of 1996, one 
month after James filed for divorce, Bullen suggested to Dowling that Dowling seek 
another counselor, namely Susan Culbertson." Complaint, R. 3, ]f 19. 
In paragraphs 9 through 22 of the Complaint, Ms. Dowling makes it clear that she 
is suing Kathleen Bullen because Ms. Bullen is a licensed clinical social worker who 
undertook to provide services to Ms. Dowling's children and husband, as well as herself. 
"As a result of Bullen's position as a counselor, Bullen occupied a special position of 
trust in the eyes of Plaintiff." Complaint, R. 3, If 16. The essence of Ms. Dowling's 
complaint is that she and her family went to Kathleen Bullen for help in dealing with 
life's challenges, including marital problems, and that Ms. Bullen, instead of helping 
them resolve their problems, seduced her husband by using her position as a trusted 
therapist. This exacerbated what was already a dysfunctional family, leading directly to 
James's decision to divorce Suzanne and marry Kathleen. 
In paragraphs 31 through 38 of the complaint, Ms. Dowling alleges that Kathleen 
breached her (Ms. Dowling's) therapist/patient privilege by sharing confidences gained in 
therapy with Kathleen's colleagues and with James, all without Ms. Dowling's consent. 
Breach of the therapist/patient privilege, by definition, arises out of and relates to health 
care rendered or which should have been rendered by Kathleen. 
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Similar allegations are set forth in paragraphs 39 through 45 of the Complaint. 
Here, Ms. Dowling alleges that she had a contractual relationship for therapy services 
with Ms. Bullen. She alleges that Ms. Bullen was obligated by the terms of the contract 
to provide counseling services that would be "in the best interest of Plaintiff." 
Complaint, R. 6, f^ 42. Clearly, a claim for breach of this duty relates to and arises out of 
the therapy relationship. 
Paragraphs 46 through 50 set forth a claim for breach of the fiduciary relationship 
between Ms. Dowling and Kathleen Bullen. She alleges that "Defendant Bullen 
breached this trust by divulging Plaintiffs confidences to Bullen's colleagues and 
Defendant's husband and by using said confidences to her own advantage in destroying 
plaintiffs marriage and entering into a relationship with Plaintiffs husband." 
Complaint, R. 7, f 48. These allegations unquestionably relate to and arise out of the 
provision of therapeutic services by Kathleen Bullen and are governed by the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. 
At oral argument in the District Court Ms. Dowling conceded that all of these 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
Transcript of Hearing, R. 115, p. 16:20-25. Consequently, she chose to focus her 
energies in opposing the motion and in perfecting this appeal on her fifth cause of action, 
the claim for alienation of affection. This claim is set out in paragraphs 51 through 58 of 
the Complaint, R. 7-8. 
In paragraph 51 Ms. Dowling "incorporate^] paragraphs 1 through 53 [sic] herein 
by reference." Complaint, R. 7, TJ51. Thus, she affirmatively alleged that her claim for 
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alienation of affection was related to and arose out of the therapy relationship to the same 
extent as the other causes of action. Wood v. Uni. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134 at ffl| 
36 - 38, 464 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 14 - 15 (holding that by incorporating all prior 
allegations into the final causes of action, plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and failure to obtain informed consent were also barred because they 
were effectively based upon claims prohibited by the Utah Wrongful Life Act). Ms. 
Dowling went on to allege: 
52. At the time Plaintiff and Plaintiffs family commenced 
counseling with Bullen at Defendant, Canyon Rim, Plaintiff and Plaintiffs 
husband were working through and resolving any difficulties they may 
have been experiencing. 
53. Defendant Bullen, by her actions in divulging Plaintiffs 
confidences, used her position of trust and influence as a licensed clinical 
social worker and family counselor, to poison Plaintiffs husband against 
Plaintiff 
54. Defendant further used her position to convince Plaintiffs 
husband to enter into a sexual relationship with Defendant and to conceal 
same from Plaintiff. 
Complaint, R. 7-8, ]ffl 52 - 54 (emphasis added). 
The only way that Ms. Dowling could have made it clearer that her allegations 
against Kathleen Bullen relate to or arise out of the health care she rendered or should 
have rendered, and thus are subject to Act's 2-year Statute of Limitations, would have 
been to quote the language of the statute in her complaint. The factual assumption made 
by the Court of Appeals, that Ms. Dowling has not complained of any act or treatment 
rendered by Kathleen Bullen during Ms. Dowling's treatment, is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the uncontroverted record. Accordingly, even if the interpretation of the statute set 
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forth by the Court of Appeals were plausible, that interpretation is not supported by the 
facts. 
CONCLUSION 
Reversal of the Court of Appeals is required to restore the Health Care Malpractice 
Act to its legislatively created meaning, to reconcile the appellate court's ruling with 
Supreme Court precedent, and to correct the factual assumptions underlying the opinion 
below. 
DATED this >f r day of May, 2003. 
CHRISTSENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
fillip S. Feifu son 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Petitioner Kathleen Bullen-Hoagland 
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Dowling v. Bullen, 2002 UT App 372, 58 P.3d 877 
Order Granting Defendant Kathleen Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment 
And Judgment 
Minute Entry of District Court 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations — Purpose 
of act. 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for 
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health 
care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the 
insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims is 
increased health care cost, both through the health care providers passing the 
cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive 
medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. 
Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to 
provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of 
malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the 
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care 
system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures 
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide 
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time estabUshing a 
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes 
unavailable from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care 
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and 
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS 78-14-3 
to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settle-
ment of claims. 
History: Lu 1976, ch. 23, § 2. act" in the last paragraph means Laws 1976, 
Meaning of "this act.* — The phrase "this Chapter 23, which enacted this chapter. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Medi-
cal Malpractice Legislation: Rx for Utah, 11 J. 
Contemp. L. 287 (1984). 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under 
Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing 
Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
certified social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiro-
practic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
clinical social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided 
in Section 31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental 
hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in 
Section 58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, 
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, 
or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, 
treatment, or confinement. 
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered 
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, physi-
cian, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, 
dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, 
physical therapist, podiatric physician, psychologist, chiropractic physi-
cian, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician 
and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social 
worker, certified social worker, social service worker, marriage and family 
counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and 
services relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups 
of persons and officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in 
the course and scope of their employment. 
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(12) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under 
Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspection Act. 
(13) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a 
licensed practical nurse as provided in Section 58-31-6. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should 
have been rendered by the health care provided 
(15) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to prac-
tice as a marriage therapist or family therapist under Section 58-60-405. 
(16) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice 
naturopathy as defined in Section 58-71-102. 
(17) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as 
a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a-302 or 58-44a-305. 
(18) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under 
Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry Practice Act. 
(19) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice oste-
opathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care 
provider, under a contract, express or implied. 
(21) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as 
provided in Section 58-17a-301. 
(22) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical 
therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice Act. 
(23) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and 
surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act. 
(24) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry 
under Title 58, Chapter 5, Podiatric Physician Licensing Act. 
(25) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a 
physician in this state under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice 
Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(26) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61, 
Psychologist Licensing Act, to practice psychology as defined in Section 
58-61-102. 
(27) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional 
nursing as provided in Section 58-31-9. 
(28) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, 
attorney-in-fact, or other legal agent of the patient. 
(29) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
social service worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(30) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person licensed to practice 
speech-language pathology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language 
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(31) "Tbrt" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or 
unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 3; 1985, ch. 242, § 16; 1996, ch. 232, § 16; 1996, ch. 247, § 47; 
§ 56; 1989, ch. 42, § 14; 1989, ch. 207, § 20; 1996, ch. 248, § 55; 1996, ch. 282, § 26. 
1991, ch. 237, § 17; 1991, ch. 287, § 13; 1992, Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amend-
ch. 240, § 20; 1994, ch. 12, § 118; 1994, ch. ment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted 
32, § 52; 1994, ch. 171, § 1; 1994, ch. 187, "chapter* for "act" in the undesignated intro-
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ductory language, inserted Subsection (4) and 
redesignated former Subsections (4) through 
(30) as Subsections (5) through (31), inserted 
"clinical social worker" in Subsection (10), and 
deleted "Part 1" from the citation in Subsection 
(21). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 12, effective May 
2, 1994, substituted "Title 26, Chapter 21, 
Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspection 
Act" for "the Hospital Licensing Act" in the 
definition of "hospital." 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 171, effective 
May 2, 1994, added Subsection (8), renumber-
ing the subsequent subsections accordingly. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 32, effective July 
1, 1994, substituted "under Section 58-60-305" 
for "as provided in Section 58-35-5" in Subsec-
tions (2), (4), and (28); deleted "social service 
aide" after "social service worker" in Subsection 
(10); substituted "under Section 58-60-405" for 
"as provided in Section 58-39-6" in Subsection 
(14); inserted "under Title 58, Chapter 61, Psy-
chologist Licensing Act" and substituted "Sec-
tion 58-61-102" for "Subsection 58-25a-2(3)" in 
Subsection (25); deleted former Subsection (28), 
defining "social service aide"; and renumbered 
former Subsections (29) through (31) as Subsec-
tions (28) through (30), respectively. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 187, effective 
July 1, 1994, corrected the references in the 
definition of "nurse midwife" and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 232, effective 
July 1, 1996, in Subsection (3) substituted 
"Title 58, Chapter 71, Chiropractic Physician 
Practice Act" for "Sections 58-12-50 through 
58-12-56, the Chiropractic Improvements Act"; 
in Subsections (6) and (7) substituted "58-69-
102" for "58-7-1.1"; in Subsection (11) substi-
tuted "podiatric physician" for "podiatrist"; in 
Subsection (13) substituted "58-31-6" for "58-
ANALYSIS 
Health care provider. 
Cited. 
Health care provider. 
The definition of "health care provider" is 
narrowly construed to include those who hold 
titles explicitly identified in Subsection (11), 
and the phrase "others rendering similar care 
and services" is interpreted to refer to the rare 
situation when a potential defendant's status 
leaves no reasonable doubt as to its necessary 
inclusion among those already listed as "health 
31-10"; in Subsection (19) substituted "Chapter 
68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act" for 
"Chapter 12, Part 1, Utah Osteopathic Medi-
cine Licensing Act"; in Subsection (21) substi-
tuted "58-17a-301" for "58-17-2"; in Subsections 
(23) and (25) substituted "Title 58, Chapter 67" 
for "Sections 58-12-26 through 58-12-43"; and 
in Subsection (24) substituted "Podiatric physi-
cian" for "Podiatrist" and "Podiatric Physician 
Licensing Act" for "Podiatrists." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 247, effective 
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (3) substituted 
"Title 58, Chapter 71, Chiropractic Physician 
Practice Act" for "Sections 58-12-50 through 
58-12-56, the Chiropractic Improvements Act"; 
in Subsections (6) and (7) substituted "58-69-
102" for "58-7-1.1"; in Subsection (13) substi-
tuted "58-31-6" for "58-31-10"; in Subsection 
(19) substituted "Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic 
Medical Practice Act" for "Chapter 12, Part 1, 
Utah Osteopathic Medicine Licensing Act"; in 
Subsection (21) substituted "58-17a-302" for 
"58-17-2"; in Subsections (23) and (25) substi-
tuted "Title 58, Chapter 67" for "Sections 58-
12-26 through 58-12-43." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
July 1, 1996, changed the references in the 
definitions of "chiropractic physician," "osteo-
pathic physician," "physician" and "practitioner 
of obstetrics." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 282, effective 
July 1, 1996, in Subsection (3) substituted 
"Title 58, Chapter 71, Chiropractic Physician 
Practice Act" for "Sections 58-12-50 through 
58-12-56, the Chiropractic Improvements Act" 
and in Subsection (16) substituted "58-71-102" 
for "58-12-22." 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
care providers." Platts v. Parents Helping Par-
ents, 897 P.2d 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
A company licensed by the Department of 
Human Services as a "day treatment" facility, 
operating a substance abuse program, and an 
"addiction counselor" employed by the company 
did not come within the definition of "health 
care provider" set forth in Subsection (11). 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 897 P.2d 
1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Cited in Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability for medical malpractice in medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
connection with performance of circumcision, caused by improper postdelivery diagnosis, 
75 A.L.R.4th 710. care, and representations, 6 A.L.R.5th 534. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other Medical malpractice: who are "health care 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother providers," or the like, whose actions fall within 
or child caused by improper treatment during statutes specifically governing action and dam-
labor, 6 A.L.R.5th 490.
 a g e s for m edical malpractice, 12 A.L.R.5th 1. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Applica-
tion. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged 
act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is 
that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the 
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent conceal-
ment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision 
of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associa-
tions and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice 
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that 
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion 
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law could 
have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of this act 
may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of this act. 
History: L. 1976, eh. 23, § 4; 1979, ch. 128, Cross-References. — Separate trial of stat-
§ 1. ute of limitations issue in malpractice actions, 
"Effective date of this act." - The phrase § 78-12-47. 
"effective date of this act" in Subsection (2) 
means the effective date of Laws 1976, Chapter 
23, which became effective April 1, 1976. 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
Hi Appellant Suzanne Dowling appeals the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to Appellee Kathleen Bullen. We reverse and 
remand. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 The operative facts of this case are undisputed, and we will 
recite them as contained in the trial courtfs summary judgment 
order, dated November 19, 2001. In late 1994, Dowlingfs 
daughters began receiving counseling from Bullen, a licenced 
clinical social worker. Dowling and her then husband, James, 
also began "individual therapy" with Bullen. In January 1996, 
James filed for divorce. By June 1996, Dowling1s family had 
completely discontinued counseling with Bullen at Bullen1s 
recommendation. On September 26, 1996, a divorce decree issued. 
At approximately the same time, James and Bullen announced their 
intention to marry, and Dowling received information indicating 
that Bullen had initiated an intimate relationship with James 
during the course of counseling and prior to the filing of the 
petition for divorce. 
^3 On September 25, 2000, Dowling filed suit for, inter alia, 
alienation of affections. Bullen filed a motion for summary 
judgment on grounds that the action was barred by the two-year 
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1996) (the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, referred to hereinafter as "the 
Act"). The trial court granted Bullenfs motion for summary 
judgment. The court concluded that the Act applied because the 
behavior complained of was "related to and [arose] out of the 
mental health treatment Ms. Bullen provided to [Dowling] and 
[Dowling1s] family," thus bringing the action within the Act!s 
purview. Dowling appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
i|4 "'We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion 
for summary judgment for correctness and accord no deference to 
the trial court's conclusions of law.'" Parduhn v. Bennet, 2002 
UT 93,H5, 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 61 {quoting Malibu Inv. Corp. v. 
Sparks, 2000 UT 30,1(12, 996 P.2d 1043). 
%5 Dowling challenges the trial court's conclusion that the 
Act's two-year statute of limitations applies to her action for 
alienation of affections. She argues that the behavior 
complained of did not "relat[e] to or arise[] out of health care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by" Bullen. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-3(15) (Supp. 2002) (defining "Malpractice 
action[s]" covered by the Act). "'The interpretation of a 
statute . . . presents a question of law, which this court 
reviews for correctness.'" Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 
55,14, 53 P.3d 473 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 
(Utah 1991) ) . 
ANALYSIS 
H6 "A trial court may properly grant summary judgment when 
'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' . . . 
In deciding whether summary judgment was appropriate, we need 
review only whether the trial court erred in applying the 
relevant law and whether a material fact was in dispute." 
WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,HlO, 454 
Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); other citations 
omitted). 
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*hl Dowling argues that even if no genuine issues of material 
fact existed,1 Bullen was not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law because her behavior was unrelated to the medical treatment 
she provided. Thus, Dowling argues, the Act!s two-year statute 
of limitations does not apply to her action for alienation of 
affections. Instead, Dowling contends the general four-year 
statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 
(1996) applies, and the trial court thus erred in awarding Bullen 
summary judgment. 
118 Section 78-14-3(15) provides: 
"Malpractice action against a health care 
provider" means any action against a health 
care provider, whether in contract, tort, 
breach of warranty, wrongful death, or 
otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health 
care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by the health care provider. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(15) (emphasis added). Bullen urges that 
the alleged injuries "aris[e] out of [the] health care" she 
provided, id., because without having provided counseling 
services Bullen never would have been in a position to develop a 
relationship with James. 
1|9 However, " [s] ubsections of a statute should not be construed 
in a vacuum but must be read as part of the statute as a whole." 
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). The 
Act's statute of limitations does not automatically apply to any 
cause of action simply because a health care provider provided 
health care. Section 78-14-3(10) provides: "'Health care1 means 
any act or treatment performed or furnished . . . by any health 
care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the 
patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-3(10) (emphasis added). Reading this definition of 
health care alongside section 78-14-3(15), which requires that 
the injuries relate to or arise out of "health care," Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-3(15), the Act requires that the health care in 
question must have been provided to the complaining patient. 
HlO In this case, Bullen provided individual treatment to both 
James and Dowling. However, the alleged alienation of 
affections, while arguably "relating to or arising out of health 
care rendered" to James, id., did not relate to or arise out of 
1. For purposes of summary judgment, Bullen admitted all the 
facts outlined in Dowlingfs complaint. 
20010961-CA 3 
the health care rendered to Bowling. Bowling, the patient, has 
not complained of "any act or treatment performed or furnished 
. . . by [Bullen] for, to, or on behalf of [Bowling] during 
[Bowling] fs medical care, treatment, or confinement." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-3(10). Thus, we conclude that the Act, when read as 
a whole, does not apply to Bowling's alienation of affections 
claim since Bowling is not "the patient[]," id., out of whose 
health care the alleged wrong arose. 
Ull Accordingly, the trial court erred in applying the Act's 
two-year statute of limitations. We reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.2 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
H12 WE CONCUR: 
i • AM • 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
y# 
William A. Thorne Jr., /fudge 
2. Because we reverse the trial court's ruling, we do not 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




KATHLEEN BULLEN, TROLLEY 
CORNERS FAMILY THERAPY CLINIC, a 
general partnership, CANYON RIM 
PSYCHOTHERAPY, and John Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
BULLEN'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000907667 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant Kathleen Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for oral argument on 
October 29,2001, at 2:00 p.m., before the Honorable Sandra Peuler, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. Plaintiff was represented by Kathleen McConkie and Defendant 
Bullen was represented by Phillip S. Ferguson. The Court, having considered the memoranda, 
affidavits, and authorities submitted by the parties, having heard oral argument, and being folly 
advised in the premises, now enters the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
A. The following facts, which were set forth in Defendant Bullen's Supporting 
Memorandum, were not controverted by plaintiff and are undisputed in the record: 
1. Suzanne Dowling was married to James Hoagland and they had two daughters. 
2. At all times relevant hereto, defendant Bullen was a licensed clinical social 
worker. 
3. In December 1994, Ms. Bullen began treating the daughters of plaintiff and her 
then husband, James Hoagland. 
4. From time to time, plaintiff and her then husband sat in on therapy sessions with 
their daughters. 
5. Both plaintiff and her then husband were in individual therapy with Ms. Bullen. 
6. Plaintiff and her then husband were unable to resolve their marital difficulties and 
James Hoagland filed for divorce in January 1996. The divorce became final on or about 
September 26, 1996. 
7. On September 26, 1996, plaintiff learned that Ms. Bullen had engaged in an 
improper relationship with her now ex-husband when her ex-husband and defendant Bullen 
announced that they were dating each other. 
8. Any therapeutic relationship between Ms. Bullen and plaintiff ended in February 
1996. 
9. Ms. Bullen terminated her therapeutic relationship with the children of Suzanne 
Dowling and James Hoagland in the Spring of 1996 (early June for one daughter and mid-April for 
the other). 
10. Defendant Bullen had no further therapy sessions with any member of plaintiff s 
family or with plaintiffs ex-husband after she terminated therapy sessions with plaintiff & daughters. 
All therapeutic contact with plaintiff and plaintiffs family had ended by early June 1996. 
11. Plaintiff did not file her Complaint until September 25,2000, more than four 
years and 3 months after the acts of negligence of which Plaintiff now complains. 
12. At no time prior to filing her Complaint did plaintiff serve defendant Bullen 
with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action or with a Request for Pre-litigation Panel Review. 
B. Based upon these undisputed facts, Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Bullen are 
related to and arise out of the mental health treatment Ms. Bullen provided to plaintiff and 
plaintiffs family between late 1994 and June 1996. 
C. Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Bullen are governed by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, §§ 78-14-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated, including the statute of limitations set 
forth at § 78-14-4(1). This statute of limitations provides that a plaintiff must file a Notice of 
Intent to Commence Action against a health care provider (which is defined to include licensed 
clinical social workers) "within two years from the date the plaintiff discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury,. ..." 
D. It is undisputed in the record that Plaintiff discovered her injury no later than 
September 26, 1996. It is undisputed in the record that plaintiff did not file her lawsuit until 
September 25, 2000. Her complaint is, therefore, barred by the plain language of the statute of 
limitations. 
E. Defendant Bullen's motion is, accordingly, granted. Plaintiffs Complaint is 
dismissed on the merits, with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Judgment be and the 
same hereby is entered in favor of Defendant Bull en and against Plaintiff Dowling, no cause of 
action. Defendant Bullen is awarded her costs incurred herein. 
^ - p DATED this /JX Day of November, 2001. 
By the Court: 
Q^-^JUfiuC^ 
Sandra N. Peuler 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
RANDLE, DEAMER, McCONKIE & LEE 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Suzanne Dowling 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE DOWLING, fk* * MINUTE ENTRY 
SUZANNE HOAGLAND, 
: 




KATHLEEN BULLEN, TROLLEY CORNERS 
FAMILY THERAPY CLINIC, a : 
general partnership, CANYON RIM 
PSYCHOTHERAPY, and John Does : 
1 through 20, 
: 
Defendants• 
Before the Court is defendant Bullenvs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Court having heard oral argument of counsel and 
having further reviewed the pleadings filed in this matter, now 
enters the following ruling. 
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. All 
of the allegations in the plaintiff's Complaint arise out of the 
plaintiff's claim that defendant Bullen committed malpractice in 
the course of treatment of various members of plaintiff's family. 
The applicable statute of limitations therefor is contained within 
the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, which provides a statute of 
limitations of two years. It is clear that this action was filed 
more than two years after plaintiff discovered the injury. 
Although plaintiff argues that no therapist/patient relationship 
DOWLING V. BULLEN PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
existed, for the purposes of this Summary Judgment the record 
indicates that such a relationship existed. 
Based upon that, the Court grants the defendant's Summary 
Judgment Motion and directs counsel for defendant Bullen to prepare 
an Order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this 3 ( day of October, 2001. 
SANDRA N. P 
DISTRICT COi 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this 3 [ day of October, 
2001: 
Kathleen NcConkie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
Attorney for Defendant Bullen 
50 S. Main, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
FILED 
THRO f ^ r q i f T COURT 
2000 SEP 25 PM l-SU 
SALT L / n E COUNTY 
Kathleen McConkie #3978 
Attorney for Plaintiff — - - —--•' • -
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-3232 
Fax:(801)531-0444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE DOWLING, 
fka SUZANNE HOAGLAND 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KATHLEEN BULLEN, TROLLEY 
CORNERS FAMILY THERAPY CLINIC, 
a general partnership, CANYON RIM 
PSYCHOTHERAPY, and John Does 1 
through 20. 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 




COMES NOW the plaintiff, Suzanne Dowling, (hereinafter "Dowling") by and through her 
attorney, Kathleen McConkie, and complains of the defendants and alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
1. The Plaintiff, Suzanne Dowling, fka Suzanne Hoagland, was a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, during the period of time of the acts complained of in this Complaint. 
Dowling is now a permanent resident of Washington State. 
2. The defendant, Kathleen Bullen (hereinafter "Bullen"), at all times pertinent hereto 
was a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Trolley Corners Family Therapy Clinic (hereinafter "Trolley Corners "), 
on information and belief, is a Utah general partnership with its principal place of business in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Canyon Rim Psychotherapy ("Canyon Rim:") is an entity operating in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. Plaintiff reserves the right to substitute the correct name and type of entity when 
the same is learned. 
5. John Does 1 through 20 are individuals believed to be the general partners of Trolley 
Corners and/or Canyon Rim. Plaintiff reserves the right to substitute the individual partners for John 
Does 1 through 20 as the same are identified. 
6. The acts complained of in this complaint occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UCA § 78-3-4. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
8. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 7 herein by 
reference. 
9. Bullen was a Licenced Clinical Social Worker, engaged in interviewing, counseling 
and/or providing professional therapy with respect to people's problems, and specifically with respect 
to Dowling and Dowling's family member's problems. 
10. Dowling, acting upon Bullen's representations, reasonably believed that Bullen was 
a therapist and/or professional counselor. 
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11. Bullen practiced with and, on information and believe was employed by, Canyon Rim 
and Trolley Corners. 
12. Dowling was married to James Anthony Hoagland, Jr., (hereinafter "James"), and 
they resided in their marital home in Salt Lake City, Utah, with their two (2) children prior to their 
divorce on September 26,1996. 
13. In late 1994, Dowling's family members began counseling sessions with Bullen in 
order to work through personal problems. 
14. Dowling, along with her family, attended numerous counseling sessions with Bullen. 
15. In December 1994, Dowling's two daughters began counseling with Bullen. 
16. In February 1995, Dowling, along with her two daughters and James, began family 
counseling with Bullen. As a result of BuUen's position as a counselor, Bullen occupied a special 
position of trust in the eyes of Plaintiff. The family or various members of the family attended 
counseling with Bullen until approximately June of 1996. 
17. During that time, the two daughters continued therapy sessions with Bullen, during 
which Bullen included Dowling in the last 1/3 of each session. 
18. During January 1996, James Hoagland filed a Petition for Divorce from Dowling. 
19. In February of 1996, one month after James filed for divorce, Bullen suggested to 
Dowling that Dowling seek another counselor, namely Susan Culbertson. 
20. On or about September 26,1996, James was granted a divorce from Plaintiff over the 
objection of Plaintiff. 
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21. About this same time, James and Bullen announced that they were dating, and they 
were eventually married. 
22. Plaintiff later learned that Bullen had initiated an intimate relationship with James, 
prior to the filing of the petition for divorce. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
23. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 22 herein by 
reference. 
24. Bullen's actions, as described, have caused and continue to cause Dowling to suffer 
financial and emotional damages, all to be proven at trial. 
25. Dowling has suffered physical and emotional pain and, with all probability, will 
continue to suffer pain for the balance of her life. 
26. Bullen's actions have caused, and in all probability will continue to cause, mental 
anguish to Dowling for the balance of her life. 
27. Dowling has experienced a loss of earnings and earning capacity as a result of 
Bullen's actions, legal fees, fees for doctors and expenses, medication, travel, relocation costs and 
loss of home. 
28. As a result of Bullen's actions, Dowling has incurred substantial physical and mental 
impairments which are permanent. 
29. Dowling is entitled to recover from Bullen damages as may be established at trial, 
including punitive damages. 
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30. Dowling is entitled to recover said damages from Defendants Trolley Corners, 
Canyon Rim, and Does 1 through 20 by virtue of the theory of respondeat superior. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Therapist/Patient Relationship 
31. Dowling incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 30 above as if fully stated. 
32. Dowling held the privilege of confidential communications between herself and 
Bullen, which privilege cannot be waived by the therapist/counselor unless expressly permitted by 
the consent of the patient. 
33. Bullen did not obtain Dowling's consent, and Dowling did not grant any expressed 
consent, for Bullen to disclose the privileged communications between herself and Dowling to 
anyone. 
34. Bullen breached the privileged relationship when she discussed the counseling 
sessions with her colleagues and with James. 
35. As a direct and proximate cause of Bullen's breach, Dowling has been damaged in 
a sum to be proven at trial. 
36. Bullen's breach, as described, has caused and continues to cause Dowling to suffer 
financial and emotional damages as hereinafter stated, all to be proven at trial. 
37. Dowling is entitled to recover all damages as maybe established at trial, together with 
punitive damages, court costs, legal expenses and attorneys fees incurred by reason of Bullen's 
breach of therapist/patient relationship. 
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38. Dowling is entitled to recover said damages from Defendants Trolley Corners, 
Canyon Rim, and Does 1 through 20 by virtue of the theory of respondeat superior. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Contract 
39. Dowling incorporates herein all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 
herein by reference. 
40. During 1994, Dowling entered into a contract with Bullen and with Canyon Rim, 
Trolley Corners and Does 1 through 20 as the employer(s) of Bullen. 
41. Pursuant to that contract, Defendants were to provide counseling services for which 
Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendants. 
42. The contract assumed that Defendants would act in the best interest of Plaintiff. 
43. Defendant Bullen and Defendants Trolley Corners, Canyon Rim, and Docs 1 through 
20, as respondeat superior, breached this agreement by acting in a manner that was not in the best 
interest of Plaintiff, by acting in a manner that was not contemplated by the parties, by lying and 
deceiving Plaintiff and eventually disrupting Plaintiffs marriage. 
44. Dowling is entitled to recover all damages as may be established at trial, together with 
punitive damages, court costs, legal expenses and attorney's fees incurred by reason of Bullen's 
breach of therapist/patient relationship. 
45. Dowling is entitled to recover said damages from Defendants Trolley Corners, 
Canyon Rim, and Does 1 through 20 by virtue of the theory of respondeat superior. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
46. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 45 herein by reference. 
47. Defendant Bullen by virtue of her position as counselor occupied a special position 
of trust. 
48. Defendant Bullen breached this trust by divulging Plaintiffs confidences to Bullen's 
colleges and Defendant's husband and by using said confidences to her own advantage in destroying 
Plaintiffs marriage and entering into a relationship with Plaintiffs husband. 
49. Dowling is entitled to recover all damages as may be established at trial, together with 
punitive damages, court costs, legal expenses and attorney's fees incurred by reason of Bullen's 
breach of her fiduciary duties to Plaintiff. 
50. Dowling is entitled to recover said damages from Defendants Trolley Corners, 
Canyon Rim, and Does 1 through 20 by virtue of the theory of respondeat superior. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Alienation of Affection 
51. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 53 herein by reference. 
52. At the time Plaintiff and Plaintiffs family commenced counseling with Bullen at 
Defendant, Canyon Rim, Plaintiff and Plaintiffs husband were working through and resolving any 
difficulties they may have been experiencing. 
53. Defendant Bullen, by her actions in divulging Plaintiffs confidences, used her 
position of trust and influence as a licensed clinical social worker and family counselor, to poison 
Plaintiffs husband against Plaintiff. 
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54. Defendant Bullen further used her position to convince Plaintiffs husband to enter 
into a sexual relationship with Defendant and to conceal same from Plaintiff. 
55. Defendant Bullen's conduct was the direct and proximate cause of the breakup of 
Plaintiffs marriage to James. 
56. Defendant Bullen's actions have directly resulted in damage to Plaintiff in that 
Plaintiff has diminished earning capacity, has suffered physical pain and mental anguish and is likely 
to continue to suffer these damages. Plaintiff has suffered the loss of her marriage, consortium, 
family relationships and loss of her home as hereinabove stated. 
5 7. Dowling is entitled to recover all damages as may be established at trial, together with 
punitive damages, court costs, legal expenses and attorney's fees incurred by reason of Bullen's 
actions and alienation of the affections of James for Plaintiff. 
58. Dowling is entitled to recover said damages from Defendants Trolley Corners, 
Canyon Rim, and Does 1 through 20 by virtue of the theory of respondeat superior. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Dowling prays for judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, as 
follows: 
1. For damages in favor of Dowling and against Defendants on all the above-stated 
causes of action in an amount to be proven at trial; 
2. For punitive damages as may be established at trial; 
3. For attorney's fees, court costs and all legal expenses incurred for the bringing of this 
action; and 
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4. For other relief that this court deems equitable and just in the premises. 
li DATED this<2Ld day of September, 2000. 
M^ /tc&A* 4? c^ 
ithleen McConkie ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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